(;
GM[1]FF[4]VW[]AP[Many Faces of Go:10.0]
SZ[19]
HA[0]
ST[0]
PB[Rin Kaiho, Meijin]
PW[Sakata Eio, Honinbo]
DT[1968-05-09 and 10]
PC[Kyushu, Japan]
KM[4.5]
TM[9 hours each]
RE[B+8.5]
SO[Go Review VIII, 7]
EV[Honinbo Title Match]
GC[by Yoshitora Fukuhara 6 Dan]
BR[9 Dan]
WR[9 Dan]
RO[Second]

C[Honinbo Title Match, 1968-05-09 
White: Sakata Eio, Honinbo
Black: Rin Kaiho, Meijin
Originally published in Go Review VIII, 7
Commentary by Yoshitora Fukuhara 6 Dan

Published in the American Go E-Journal March 18, 2002.
Transcribed by Bill Cobb & edited
by Chris Garlock in Many Faces of Go.

Send comments to journal@usgo.org
];B[qd];W[dd];B[oc];W[pp]
C[White 2 and 4 represent a rather new style of playing for Sakata.
Having won the first game of this match, perhaps he felt daring.
];B[dq];W[co];B[dl];W[dn]
;B[fp];W[bq];B[jq]
C[Black 5 through 11 is a very popular joseki.
];W[qj]
C[White 12 is the only reasonable move at this stage. It limits
the development of Black's corner enclosure above and, by reaching
from the corner star point to just below the edge star point,
it gives White good shape.
];B[qh]
C[Black 13, in conjunction with the corner enclosure, emphasizes
territorial development and promises the chance to put a wedge
in White's expansion upwards from the corner.  It is a calm,
steady move.
];W[fc]
C[White 14 emphasizes development toward the right to counter the
potential Black is developing in the upper right corner. The
knight's jump from the corner star point may also be regarded
as a kind of corner enclosure in that one's opponent will seldom
find it to his advantage to invade a corner so enclosed. In this
game White 14 also anticipates a white pincer attack on Black
7.
];B[qn];W[nq]
C[White 16 is on the third line rather than at O4 to insure a base
and some territory in the corner for White in the face of possible
invasions along the edges from Black 11 and/or 15.  It also anticipates
attacking Black 15 and, indirectly, 7.  White cannot attack Black
7 directly at this point with a pincer since Black would not
defend it but would attack the lower right corner.  However,
White must attack Black 7, and in this case the best offense
is a good defense.
];B[di]
C[Faced with the problem of having to defend both 15 and 7, Rin
chose to defend 7. This is a matter of the individual professional's
taste or judgment, and a player who chose to defend 15 could
not be accused of making a poor choice.
];W[qo]
;B[pn]
C[This exchange of White 18 for Black 19 is natural.
];W[ql]
C[White 20 is a typically severe, Sakata-style move. A "smoother"
more harmoniously minded player such as Takagawa could be expected
to make a one point jump to the left of 12 into the center.
];B[no]
C[Black 21 is good shape.
]
(;W[nk]
C[White 22 is an unusual way to precipitate the battle: because
of the possibility of an invasion at the 3-3 point, the sequence
in the variation is normal in this situation. The usual choice
might perhaps be attributed to Sakata's strong fighting spirit.
The usual sequence (in the variation) is biased toward defense.
];B[mq]
C[Black 23 is designed to enclose White's three corner stones.
In all probability the coming battle will see the black stones
grow strong enough to free themselves of White's attack.
];W[np];B[mp];W[mo];B[nn];W[lo];B[nr];W[or]
;B[mr];W[mm]
C[With White 22 to 32 the battle is fully joined.  The white group
in the corner has several weak points--the 3-3 point and the
cut at P3 for instance--and the white fence around the black
stones is not impenetrable, but Black is not in a comfortable
position.  If he makes one mistake, if he loses this battle,
he has essentially lost the game. Therefore Rin took more than
three hours to study and work out all the variations and sequences
that might arise from this position.
];B[pk];W[pl]
C[White 34 announces White's intention to capture the four black
stones.
];B[ro]
C[Black 35 is considered just the slightest bit questionable because
if Black had played at R4, no unfavorable variations would have
been possible. Why then did Black not play at R4? Because the
sequence through 37 leaves the possibility of a ko, which, even
if Rin loses this battle will give him two moves elsewhere and
thus leave him some chance of winning the game despite the loss
of the battle.
];W[rp];B[rm];W[op];B[ol];W[om]
;B[ok];W[nl];B[rq];W[so];B[pi];W[qk]
C[After White 46 the outcome of the battle depends on the ko that
will be created when Black plays at T6.
];B[cd]
C[Black 47 creates ko threats as well as being one.
];W[cc];B[dc];W[db]
;B[sn]
C[With Black 51 the ko fight begins.
];W[rn];B[de];W[ec]
C[The ponnuki created by White 54 is worth about 20 points.
];B[ro];W[sp];B[qq];W[qp];B[on];W[nm]
(;B[ni]
C[Black 61 is a kind of "aji keshi", an erasure of White's potentiality
here, that must be described as a calm, steady, typically Rin-like
move.  Black cannot save his group by filling in the ko; see
the variation.
];W[tt]
(;W[rn]
C[Taking the ko with White 62 insures that Black won't play as
in the variation to force the white group to fight a very disadvantageous
ko fight that he must win to live.
];B[kd]
C[Black 63 is the only play: it gives Black a sort of "double wing"
formation in the corner with the promise of a very large territory
and it limits the white group in the upper left corner.
];W[rh]
C[White 64 lays the foundation for a wedge somewhere in the Black
corner.
];B[ri];W[qi];B[rg];W[ph];B[sh]
(;W[qg]
C[White cannot play 70 as in the variation since it would give
Black much too firm a hold on the large corner territory. Hence
this ko.
];B[oh]
C[Black also has no choice but to play the ko with 71.
];W[rh];B[mn];W[ln];B[qh];W[pg];B[rh];W[pd]
;B[pe];W[pc];B[od];W[qc];B[re];W[sm]
C[White 84: White had to resolve this ko sooner or later or suffer
the consequences.  Observers seeing this play thought Sakata
must have been confident of victory and other professionals judged
the game somewhat favorable for Sakata.  It should be borne in
mind, however, that Rin is very strong in the middle and end
game.
];B[br];W[cq];B[cr];W[hq]
C[White 88: Sakata was aiming at this invasion when he played 86.
]
;B[ip];W[eq];B[dp];W[er];B[do];W[hp];B[cp];W[ir];B[in];W[jr]
;B[lp];W[ep];B[eo];W[fo];B[en];W[go];B[jo];W[kq];B[kp]
C[White 90 through Black 107 is a very large exchange: the lower
edge for the left edge. This exchange was to White's advantage
because through it the black territory on the lower edge has
completely disappeared and the black group on the lower edge
has become a little unstable.
];W[lr]
C[White 108 is a very bad move because it permits ...
]
;B[ob]
C[... Black 109.  This move kills the white group and throws the
whole game open again.  At this point Mr. Fukuhara said, "In
games between high ranking professional players the terms 'advantage',
'disadvantage', 'thickness', 'thinness' and others of their kind
must be considered very fluid.  Since they reflect only the judgment
of the commentator based upon what he can see; they may change
very quickly."
];W[km]
C[White 110: In attacking the black stones on the lower edge White
must play here first lest Black cut and revive the apparently
dead stones on the lower right edge.
];B[hm];W[gm];B[gl];W[fm];B[ch]
C[Black 115:  Now Rin is confident of winning.  White's 112 and
114 are the secure, relatively non-aggressive moves of a man
sure of victory. Unfortunately Sakata was in error in judging
the situation over the whole board. The black territory in the
upper right corner is too large and Sakata should have attacked
there with his 112 and 114. While Sakata's judgment of severe
plays is almost unequalled, his relative weakness is in judging
the whole board situation.  In that area Rin, and Takagawa, are
superior. That Rin's judgment was the more accurate in this case
may be judged by the result of this game--Rin won by 8.5 points.
];W[dk];B[ck];W[ek]
;B[cj];W[em];B[dm];W[dr];B[bp];W[ce];B[ic]
C[Black 125: The movement of the stones has been very natural to
this point.
];W[mh]
C[White 126 also attacks the lower black group.
];B[mi];W[lh]
;B[ng];W[le];B[ld];W[li];B[hj]
C[Black 133 is a natural answer to the natural attack culminating
in White 132.
];W[ne];B[nf];W[md];B[mc];W[ke]
;B[cf];W[bd];B[bf];W[hc];B[id]
C[Black 143: Again, all natural moves to this point. The difference
between Black and White now stands about ten points in Black's
favor, an almost insurmountable gap. Sakata, however, is known
for giving his best to the bitter end and almost never concedes
defeat. This is in contrast to, for instance, Takagawa and Yamabe
who often concede when they judge the situation unfavorable.

Rin had exhausted his allotted time and now entered into byoyomi--he
had to play within a minute and the time keeper called out the
passing time every five seconds. The waitress attending Rin said
she felt the air had grown terribly oppressive, but Rin seemed
to be in his element and enjoying himself, secure in his knowledge
that the result of the game had been decided. Sakata had an hour
of time left.

There is no comment on the remaining moves. As an overall comment,
Mr. Fukuhara said, "Sakata's art was much in evidence in the
first portion of the game, but he seemed to fade in the middle
game." Black wins by 8.5 points. Game ends with move 246.
];W[ib];B[jb];W[mf];B[os];W[pr]
;B[hb];W[gb];B[ia];W[ee];B[nd];W[me];B[jk];W[il];B[jl];W[gk]
;B[ll];W[jm];B[im];W[kl];B[hk];W[fl];B[hl];W[mj];B[oe];W[rj]
;B[ds];W[es];B[cs];W[gp];B[hd];W[kk];B[jj];W[df];B[kj];W[lj]
;B[gc];W[dg];B[cg];W[jh];B[lq];W[kr];B[oi];W[mg];B[gj];W[pj]
;B[fk];W[el];B[fb];W[gd];B[ga];W[ge];B[ps];W[qs];B[ns];W[qr]
;B[if];W[iq];B[ko];W[kn];B[je];W[oj];B[qf];W[gh];B[eh];W[fg]
;B[eg];W[fj];B[lk];W[lm];B[ih];W[jg];B[hh];W[gi];B[ff];W[hg]
;B[fi];W[ef];B[ej];W[jp];B[io];W[jf];B[he];W[ae];B[af];W[gf]
;B[ki];W[kh];B[be];W[ad];B[sj];W[sk];B[ea];W[da];B[eb];W[ii]
;B[hi];W[ij];B[ik];W[ji];B[nh];W[ls];B[si];W[jq])
(;W[oi];B[oh];W[pj];B[pg]))
(;B[pr]))
(;B[rn];W[pr];B[ri];W[rl];B[pm]))
(;W[rn];B[rm];W[ro];B[qm];W[rl]))
